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HEATHER G. WIGHT-AXLING*

Will the Durational Element Endure?
Only Time Will Tell: Temporary
Regulatory Takings in the Court of
Federal Claims and Federal Circuit
after Tahoe-Sierra
ABSTRACT
In the 2002 Tahoe-Sierra case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
a 32-month moratorium on development imposed by a local
government agency did not constitute a taking within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Although Tahoe-Sierra addressed the actions of a local
government agency, the case has been equally instructive in
federal takings litigation. The Court of Federal Claims is the
exclusive forum in which to bring suits against the federal
government, and, as such, it is the epicenter of federal takings
litigation. In many federal cases in which takings are alleged,
plaintiffs challenge the denial or delay of a permit. Prior to the
Tahoe-Sierra decision, it was well established that a plaintiff
seeking compensation for delay occasioned by a federally
mandated permitting process would have to show that there had
been "extraordinarydelay." Notably, the Court of Federal Claims
cases decided after Tahoe-Sierra appear to preserve the
longstanding test of "extraordinary delay" with respect to
permitting decisions. However, the Court of Federal Claims has
added an interesting twist, now using "extraordinarydelay" as a
threshold requirement before ever reaching the Penn Central
balancing test endorsed by Tahoe-Sierra. These cases suggest
that there is a growing trend in federal courts to favor
government defendants in Fifth Amendment takings cases where
the claim is based on temporary regulatory action.

J.D. 2004, University of New Mexico School of Law; M.A. 2000, Western
Washington University; B.A. 1997, Willamette University.
*
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution precludes the federal government from taking "private
property" for "public use" without paying just compensation.' While
physical takings, appropriations, and other confiscatory measures clearly
justify compensation, recourse is less certain when the government
action is regulatory in nature. Nowhere is this dispute more fraught with
tension than in regulatory takings claims involving environmental
protection measures. 2 The debate becomes even more heated when,
rather than depriving a property owner of all use of the land, the
regulation effects a temporary or a partial taking.
In Tahoe-Sierra PreservationCouncil, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 3 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 32-month moratorium on
development did not effect a temporary regulatory taking of the
plaintiffs' property. The case marked a decisive move away from the
categorical, per se approach of Lucas and a return to the ad hoc balancing
test of Penn Central. The case was also important because it recognized
that, when courts identify the "relevant parcel" in such inquiries, they
should consider the temporal dimension of landowner rights. 4 In other
words, a landowner who is temporarily deprived of the use of his land
but still enjoys the right of future use arguably suffers little damage to
his "parcel." Advocates of thoughtful and deliberate land use planning
heralded the decision as a landmark case in takings jurisprudence.
Indeed, after Tahoe-Sierra, the viability of any temporary regulatory
takings claim will be called into question.
Notably, subsequent cases decided by the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims (CFC) and the Federal Circuit support the Tahoe-Sierra holding
and renew the emphasis on the duration of such temporary restraints.
The CFC, with appeals to the Federal Circuit, is the exclusive forum in
which to bring suits against the federal government, and is therefore the
epicenter of federal takings litigation. 5 These courts have taken Tahoe1.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

2. See Courtney Harrington, Penn Central to Palazzolo: Regulatory Takings Decisions
and Their Implicationsfor the Future of Environmental Regulation, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 383, 385
(2002). Environmental regulations and policies affecting a landowner's ability to develop
have skyrocketed over the last 30 years. See Nancy G. Marzulla, The Property Rights
Movement: How It Began and Where It Is Headed, in LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990S PROPERTY
RIGHTS REBELLION 1, 15 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995).
3. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). Justice Stevens wrote for the 6-3 majority.
4. Tahoe-Sierra indicated that courts should evaluate many different considerations,
"one of which is the length of the delay." Id. at 338 n.34 (emphasis added).
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (2000) (the Tucker Act).
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Sierra a step further; they appear to have supplemented the Penn Central
test with an additional and dispositive element, requiring plaintiff
landowners to make a showing of "extraordinary delay" before they are
even allowed to make a Penn Central argument. This suggests that there
is a trend afoot in the judiciary to favor government defendants in
temporary regulatory takings, perhaps to further a general policy of
upholding development controls in aid of environmentally friendly land
use and development.
Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Tahoe-Sierra suggested that
temporary takings claims might never prevail. However, there are
important limitations on the Tahoe-Sierra decision, and the subsequent
cases decided by the Federal Circuit must be read in light of those
limitations. One such limitation is the fact that the challenge in TahoeSierra was aimed at a local government agency's moratorium on
development. Therefore, some would argue, Tahoe-Sierra'sapplication is
limited to moratoria mandated by state or local government agencies.
Since states are entitled to significant deference when they act pursuant
to their police powers, 6 state-imposed moratoria may be more insulated
from Fifth Amendment takings allegations than federal regulation. Also,
because moratoria apply broadly to all individuals within a certain
locality, they affect a wide range of people equally rather than singling
anyone out. Thus, embedded within the Tahoe-Sierra decision is the idea
that these "state moratoria" cases are not compelling Fifth Amendment
cases and will infrequently result in a finding of a taking.
In contrast, most Fifth Amendment takings claims are as-applied
challenges, many of which involve delays in permitting where a federal
agency is the defendant. Because the permitting process is inherently
individualized, the delays occasioned by the process should arguably be
evaluated with more scrutiny than moratoria that apply to a broad range
of individuals.
II. HOW HAS TAHOE-SIERRA AFFECTED THE DECISIONS OF THE
COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS?
In light of the distinctions between federal permitting cases and
state moratoria cases, the question is this: after Tahoe-Sierra, are courts
more sympathetic to individual plaintiff's that are seeking permits
6. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125
(1978) (noting that where a State "reasonably conclude[s] that the 'health, safety, morals, or
general welfare' would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land,"
the government does not owe the landowner compensation).
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pursuant to federal statue than to plaintiffs that are affected generally by
a state or local moratorium? Court of Federal Claims cases appear to say
no. As it turns out, "federal permit" cases are being decided under the
same test, if not a more stringent one, than "state moratoria" cases. Prior
to the Tahoe-Sierra decision, it was well established that a plaintiff
seeking compensation for delay occasioned by a permitting process
would have to show that there had been "extraordinary delay." 7
Notably, the CFC cases decided during 2002 and 2003 appear to preserve
the longstanding test of "extraordinary delay" 8 with respect to
permitting decisions. However, the CFC has added an interesting twist
to Tahoe-Sierra. Now, the CFC appears to use "extraordinary delay" as a
threshold requirement, before ever reaching the Penn Central balancing
test endorsed by Tahoe-Sierra. This suggests that there is a trend in U.S.
courts to favor government defendants in Fifth Amendment takings
cases where the claim is based on temporary regulatory action. It is
significant that this trend exists even when adverse effects are doled out
on an individualized basis through the denial or delay of a permit. The
logical conclusion is that there is wider, and growing, acceptance in the
U.S. court system for interim development controls and recognition for
the need for sensible development and environmental protection. The
result is that occasionally individual landowners will have to bear the
brunt of a government's implementation of comprehensive land-use
plans.
This article begins with an overview of the history of temporary
regulatory takings and the merits of moratoria and permits as interim
development controls. Next, this article will evaluate post-Tahoe-Sierra
decisions from the CFC and the Federal Circuit involving temporary
regulatory takings claims. The cases will be discussed in light of two
related issues: (1) whether the CFC and Federal Circuit have applied the
same reasoning in "federal permit" cases that the U.S. Supreme Court
used in the Tahoe-Sierra "state moratoria" case, and (2) what test these
courts are applying to temporary regulatory takings cases in the wake of
Tahoe-Sierra. Before exploring this in more detail, a discussion of the
history of regulatory takings will provide some context.

7. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980); Danforth v. United States, 308
U.S. 271, 285 (1939).
8. Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States, 57 Fed. CI. 115, 131 (2003); Wyatt v. United States,
271 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 717 (2002);
Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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III. A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
A. Physical Takings
Property rights perhaps are among the most cherished and
protected rights in our system of jurisprudence. The Fifth Amendment
was one of the early incarnations of laws enacted to protect them;
however, courts have struggled for a century to define the parameters of
its Takings Clause. Clearly, the Fifth Amendment was designed for
physical appropriations of private property by the government. At least
initially, this was understood to apply strictly to the tangible aspect of
property ownership. However, property ownership clearly involves
other, less tangible, benefits. One court characterized it as follows:
"'Property' is more than just the physical thing- the land, the bricks, the
mortar-it is also the sum of all the rights and powers incident to
9
ownership of the physical thing. It is the tangible and the intangible."
At root, the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of compensation was
designed "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole." 10
B. Regulatory Takings
By its plain language, the Fifth Amendment requires
compensation for the physical appropriation of property. But the
Constitution is silent with respect to regulatory takings, which may
prohibit a property owner from using private property just as effectively
as would a physical appropriation. To fill this gap, the U.S. Supreme
Court has inferred from the Takings Clause that government regulations
affecting land use can trigger constitutionally-compelled compensation.
In the seminal Pennsylvania Coal case, Chief Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes penned the now-famous maxim: "while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.""

9. Passailaigue v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 682, 686 (M.D. Ga. 1963).
10. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
11. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. A separate issue, beyond the scope of this article, is the
remedy available for plaintiffs who prevail under such a theory. Plaintiffs may either
receive just compensation or the regulation itself may be invalidated. Although physical
and regulatory takings claims share a constitutional origin, the Court in Tahoe-Sierra
warned that they should not be used interchangeably as controlling precedents; regulatory
takings cases should be understood to occupy a separate "fork" in takings jurisprudence.
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Claims of regulatory takings in the United States originated in
the early twentieth century. 12 The Supreme Court first recognized
regulatory takings as compensable in its watershed decision in
Pennsylvania Coal.13 This case heralded the proposition that regulations
could effect a taking if they were unduly burdensome. 14 The Court
refrained, however, from suggesting a bright-line test for identifying
regulatory takings. This ambiguity became the focus of subsequent
regulatory takings claims, which were ubiquitous during the growth of
the administrative state and the attendant evolution of regulatory law.
1. Penn Central:Evaluating the "Parcel as a Whole"
Half a century after Pennsylvania Coal, the Court finally proposed
a balancing test for regulatory takings claims in Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. New York City.15 There, the owners of Grand Central
Station sought to construct a tower above the terminal. The city
prohibited such construction because of the property's designation as a
historical landmark. The Court decided that the owners were not due
just compensation as a result of this restriction on the use of their
property. To explain its reasoning, the Court set forth a three-pronged
test, evaluating (1) the regulation's economic impact on the landowner,
(2) the regulation's interference with distinct investment-backed
expectations of the landowner, and (3) the character of the governmental
action. 16 Because the landowners in this case were free to explore other,
non-prohibited development activities, any adverse economic impact
caused by the regulation was mitigated and therefore did not warrant
compensation from the government.

Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 303
(2002).
12. Not coincidentally, claims of regulatory takings originated during the same period
as the growth of administrative government. With the burgeoning number of federal
regulations enacted over the last century, regulatory takings claims have risen
correspondingly. In the last few years, the High Court has delivered a series of opinions
commenting on the issues inherent in such disputes. Tahoe-Sierra represents their latest
position.
13. 260 U.S. at 415. Prior to Pennsylvania Coal, the doctrine of takings was restricted to
physical acquisitions of property.
14. Id. at 414-15. The case also introduced the "diminution of value" standard for
evaluating regulatory takings by examining the regulation's financial impact on property.
Id. at 414.
15. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
16. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124.
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Justice Brennan, who delivered the opinion of the Court, also
used the opportunity to articulate the "parcel as a whole" approach to
takings assessments. He wrote,
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights
in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.
[Instead]... this Court focuses rather both on the character
of the action and on the nature and extent of the
17
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.
Justice Brennan thus required that the "aggregate...be viewed in its
entirety" 18 and, in so stating, set forth an important principle about the
"parcel" that would shape takings jurisprudence over the next few
decades.
The U.S. Supreme Court again explored the extent of the
government's authority to act in the public interest in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis.19 There, a state statute required that
a certain portion of subterranean coal remain in place to prevent
instability on the surface. The plaintiffs argued that this regulation was a
taking of their "support estate," which was recognized in Pennsylvania
law as a separate estate in real property. In spite of the state law to the
contrary, the Court refused to recognize the support estate as a piece of
property that could be "taken" and upheld the regulation. In doing so,
the Court supported the "parcel as a whole" principle, which dictates
that uses of property cannot be segregated and evaluated separately.
Rather, the overall use of the property is the appropriate "denominator"
to evaluate. 20 The Keystone case is thus regarded as articulating the
21
"denominator" principle.
2. The Legal Anomaly of Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council
The "parcel as a whole" and "denominator" principles were
characterized quite differently in the controversial 1992 Lucas v. South
17. Id. at 130-31.
18. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 327 (2002).
19. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 (1987).
20. In a departure from this rule, the Oregon Court of Appeals recently decided that
the "whole parcel" rule does not apply in Oregon. Oregon courts thus will examine only
those portions of property that are subject to the use regulation. Coast Range Conifers, LLC
v. State, 76 P.3d 1148 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a regulation that affected nine acres
of a 40-acre parcel did effect a regulatory taking).
21. See also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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Carolina Coastal Council decision. 22 After purchasing two beachfront lots,
David Lucas was prohibited by a subsequently-enacted statute from
developing the land. 23 The Lucas Court ruled that regulations that
deprive owners of "all economically beneficial use" of their property are
takings requiring just compensation. 24 Significantly, the Court equated
the regulatory taking that deprived Lucas of all economic use of his land
with traditional physical takings, calling them both "per se" takings that
warrant just compensation. To use the jargon of Keystone, the Lucas Court
identified the "denominator" as the economic use of the property, even
the temporary use of that property. In so deciding, the Court declined to
consider other characterizations of the denominator, such as the
possibility of future use or other beneficial, though non-economic, uses.
Significantly, Lucas helped lay the groundwork for the
petitioners' arguments in Tahoe-Sierra. They argued that a temporary
taking occasioned by a moratorium on development amounted to a per
se taking, no matter how brief the deprivation of rights, because it
deprived owners of all economic use. The Court in Tahoe-Sierra was not
convinced by the per se argument and took pains to carefully delineate
the rare circumstances under which such an argument might prevail.
C. Temporary versus Partial Takings
The bundle of rights metaphor, when applied to takings
problems, requires an analysis of whether a taking of one stick in the
bundle entitles a landowner to compensation. Takings jurisprudence
gets muddled when claimants allege partial or temporary takings. Partial
takings usually involve physical takings, while temporary takings are
generally regulatory in nature. This is an important distinction to
recognize, especially in light of the Supreme Court's emphasis in TahoeSierra that physical and regulatory takings should be evaluated using
two different tests. 25
Partial takings are often raised in the context of leaseholds to
surface and mineral rights. 26 They also arise when a particular segment
22. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
23. South Carolina Beachfront Management Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to 48-39360 (West, WESTLAW through 2004 legislation).
24. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
25. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
303 (2002). See also discussion infra note 87 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 717 (2002); Cane Tenn., Inc.
v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 100 (2002); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470 (1987); Walcek v. United States, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Machipongo
Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751 (Pa. 2002).
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of property is regulated while the remaining portion remains
unregulated; for example, when 15 acres on a 20-acre lot are subject to
the Endangered Species Act by virtue of the presence of a listed bird's
habitat.
Temporary takings are distinct from partial takings, in that they
are generally regulatory rather than physical in nature. Temporary
takings deny a landowner the right to use his property for a limited
period of time. Courts struggle with the issue of whether a temporary
regulatory restriction on land development should trigger a Fifth
Amendment right to compensation. The problem becomes more complex
when landowners are prohibited from enjoying the full use of their
property, but for a brief time only. Significantly, temporary takings
sometimes deny a landowner the use of an entire physical parcel of land,
though not indefinitely. Temporary regulatory takings claims are based
on the underlying belief that the power to use and enjoy property
derives its power from the owner's ability to enjoy and use her land
whenever she sees fit. Tahoe-Sierra's denial of a temporary regulatory
takings claim is significant because, in using the "parcel as a whole"
standard, the Court acknowledged that landowners who cannot develop
land presently still retain a valuable interest in being able to use and
enjoy the land at a future, though unspecified, date. Taken literally,
Tahoe-Sierra would seem to preclude any temporary regulatory takings
claim, no matter how long the duration.
The Supreme Court recognized that a regulation could trigger a
temporary taking for the first time in a 1982 decision. In First English
Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, the Court held that
temporary land use restrictions that deprive a landowner of all
economically beneficial use, even if ultimately lifted, justify the payment
of just compensation. 27 The plaintiff in that case was a church that
owned land located in a canyon along a watershed area. The church used
the land as a campground and retreat center for handicapped children.
When a flood destroyed the buildings in 1978, Los Angeles County
adopted an interim ordinance forbidding the construction or
reconstruction of any building within a certain flood-prone region. a The
church's property fell within the protected area. The church filed suit
against the county soon after, alleging that the interim ordinance
stripped the church of all use of the property. The Supreme Court noted
that "'temporary' takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his
27. 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987). Importantly, the case has subsequently been characterized
as addressing the "remedial" question only, and not issuing a formal holding on the
"takings" issue. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 328.
28. First English, 482 U.S. at 307.
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property are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the
Constitution clearly requires compensation." 29 In dicta, the Court in First
English indicated that "normal delays in obtaining building permits,
changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like" might not warrant
30
compensation.
The Court was divided in First English; Justices Stevens,
Blackmun, and O'Connor joined in dissent. 31 They noted that regulations
are three-dimensional in terms of their depth, width, and length. They
wrote,
As for depth, regulations define the extent to which the
owner may not use the property in question. With respect
to width, regulations define the amount of property
encompassed by the restrictions. Finally, and for purposes
of this case, essentially, regulations set forth the duration of
the restrictions. It is obvious that no one of these elements
can be analyzed alone to evaluate the impact of a
regulation, and hence to determine whether a taking has
occurred. 32
The cases highlighted in this article review various methods of
interim development controls, regulatory devices used to bring
development to a halt temporarily while the impact of such development
is assessed. Interim development controls come in all shapes and sizes
and can include statutes, ordinances, moratoria, or permit requirements.
First English, for example, dealt with an interim ordinance forbidding
development. In Tahoe-Sierra,petitioners challenged the use of moratoria.
In contrast, many of the temporary takings claims heard in the Court of
Federal Claims involve disputes over the delay or the denial of a
permit. 33 The next section of this article will review these various
development controls before summarizing the events leading up to the
Tahoe-Sierracase.

29. Id. at 318.
30. Id. at 321.
31. Id. at 322.
32. Id. at 330.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000). The Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over suits in
which the federal government is a defendant, arising from a statute or regulation, among
other things. Plaintiffs often bring suit against the government as the result of a permitting
requirement contained in a federal statute. This is the exclusive forum for such claims if the
plaintiff seeks compensation in excess of $10,000.
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IV. INTERIM DEVELOPMENT CONTROLS: THE DIFFERENT
POLICY OBJECTIVES BEHIND MORATORIA AND PERMITS
Both federal and state governmental entities employ the use of
interim development controls as a means of promoting orderly
community development and reducing hazards and inconvenience.
Government entities retain the ultimate authority to utilize zoning
statutes, ordinances, moratoria or permit requirements in order to
implement comprehensive, long-term land use plans. Zoning statutes are
arguably the most widely accepted devices, as zoning has long been
regarded as a constitutional exercise of state police power. 34 But a state's
uses of other devices, such as moratoria or permit requirements, have
not enjoyed such widespread acceptance. Indeed, some landowners
challenge the use of these land use tools on constitutional grounds,
arguing that they compromise individual liberties.
Permit requirements and moratoria both fall under the broad
umbrella of land use controls, but the two devices serve different policy
concerns. Stated simply, permits affect individuals, while moratoria
affect a wider group of landowners.
A. Moratoria
Tahoe-Sierra dealt with a series of moratoria that stymied
development for 32 months. Moratoria are frequently used when
government entities require extra time to maintain the status quo and
assess the environmental impact of development. These interim
development controls are an important component in wisely planned
growth and are generally recognized as permissible exercises of a state's
police powers. 35 They are sometimes referred to as "stop-gap" zoning
devices, and are used to "temporarily freez[e] land development" by
allowing only uses that are "consistent with a contemplated zoning plan
or zoning change." 36 The Tahoe-Sierra decision lauded the use of
development moratoria, characterizing them as "an essential tool of
successful development." 37 The Court also pointed to decisions from
34. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
35. Id.
36. Mark. S. Dennison, Zoning: Proofof Unreasonablenessof Interim Zoning and Building
Moratoria,32 AM. J. POF 3d 485, § 3 (2003).
37. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
338 (2002). The Court also expressed its concern for the implications of a different decision,
pointing out that "land-use regulations are ubiquitous and most of them impact property
values in some tangential way -often in completely unanticipated ways. Treating them all
as per se takings would transform government regulation into a luxury few governments
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around the nation that had held development moratoria were not
38
takings within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
Moratoria, although characterized as "interim" controls,
sometimes prohibit development for long periods of time. There is no
bright-line rule regarding the permissible duration of moratoria. Courts
have upheld the validity of moratoria ranging from nine months 39 to six
years or more. 40 Occasionally, even "open-ended" moratoria, without
termination points, have been upheld. 41 The only limits on moratoria are
that they must "protect a significant public interest, be narrowly tailored
and of the shortest reasonable duration, and provide limited use of the
42
property during the moratorium, if possible."
B. Permits
While moratoria occasionally hinder a landowner's ability to
develop, more frequently, a landowner's ability to develop is hindered
by a permitting process. 43 Permits are required for development in a
could afford." Id. at 324. See also J. JUERGENSMEYER & T. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND

CONTROL LAW §§ 5.28(G), 9.6 (1998); Elizabeth A. Garvin & Martin L. Leitner, Drafting
Interim Development Ordinances: Creating Time to Plan, 48 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3
(June 1996); Robert H. Freilich, Interim Development Controls: Essential Tools for Implementing
Flexible Planning and Zoning, 49 U. DET. J. URB. L. 65 (1971); Kenneth H. Young, Interim
Controls, in 2 ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 10:03 (4th ed. 1996 & Supp. 2003);
Adam L. Wekstein, Land Use and Zoning, 485 PRAc. L. INST. REAL EST. L. & PRAC. 489, 50406 (2002).
38. See, e.g., Santa Fe Village Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 914 F. Supp. 478, 483
(D.N.M. 1995) (30-month moratorium not a taking); Williams v. City of Central, 907 P.2d
701, 703-06 (Colo. App. 1995) (10-month moratorium not a taking); Zilber v. Town of
Moraga, 692 F. Supp. 1195,1198 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (18-month moratorium not a taking).
39. Friel v. Triangle Oil Co., 76 Md. App. 96 (1988).
40. Offen v. County Council for Prince George's County, 625 A.2d 424 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1993) (upholding eight-year sewer moratorium on development in most of the
county), rev'd on other grounds, 639 A.2d 1070 (Md. 1994); Ord v. Kitsap County, 929 P.2d
1172 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding six-year moratorium on building required by state
forestry statute); HBP Assoc. v. Marsh, 893 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (upholding tenyear moratorium on sewer extensions).
41. See, e.g., Dallas v. Crownrich, 506 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Metro.
Dade County v. Rosell Constr. Corp., 297 So. 2d 46 (Fla. App. 1974); see generally Matthew
G. St. Amand & Dwight H. Merriam, Defensible Moratoria: The Law Before and After the
Tahoe-Sierra Decision, SJ015 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 925, 93641 (2003).
42. St. Armand & Merriam, supra note 41, at 951; see also ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE
TAKINGS ISSUE 272-78 (1999). "Escape hatches" are also favored to allow property owners a
way out. In re Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972) (moratorium with
a capital improvement buyout provision upheld).
43. Incidentally, although Tahoe-Sierra was principally concerned with the
constitutionality of the development moratoria, the Court also briefly addressed permitting
delays. The Court pointed out that, under the modified categorical rule the petitioners were
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wide variety of contexts through federal statutes and are most frequently
used to protect environmentally fragile zones. 44 For example, the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) requires permits as a
precondition to surface mining as a means of mitigating the adverse
environmental effects of coal mining operations. 45 Through the
permitting process, the permitting agency or office evaluates the
applicant's ability to comply with the applicable regulations and, when
necessary, adhere to certain mitigation measures. In the case of the
SMCRA, for example, the permit-holder must "restore the approximate
original contour of the land." 46 This becomes one of the many factors
that the Office of Surface Mining will consider when weighing a permit
application. When a permit is denied, or the granting of a permit is
delayed during the decision-making process, developers often cry
takings.
C. The Individualized Impact of Permit Denials
Permits are distinct from moratoria in a number of senses. For
one thing, moratoria are generally enacted pursuant to state statute or
local ordinances. 47 As such, they are often entitled to deference because
they arise from state police power. In contrast, many permitting
requirements derive from federal statutes or state systems that have met
with federal approval. 48 Permits also differ from moratoria in terms of
the scope of their application. Moratoria allow government agencies to
make well-reasoned decisions about long-range plans and goals.
Moratoria create a "reciprocity of advantage," because they protect the
interests of many even if they simultaneously restrain permissible
activity. 49 Permits, on the other hand, affect individuals. This is the crux
of landowner complaints in permitting cases.
arguing for, there would be no per se taking if the TRPA had delayed a permitting process
in order to wait for an environmental assessment plan. See Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 337 n.31.
44. See, e.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328
(2000); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 153 9 (a) (2000) (incidental take permits); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (fill permits required on federally regulated wetlands);
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6902 (2000) (permits to comply with disposal
regulations); Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act, Pub. L. No. 102-579, 106
Stat. 4777 (1992) (requiring permits for drilling from outside the withdrawn lands).
45. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (2000).
46. Id. § 1265(b)(3).
47. See Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 342 n. 37.
48. The CFC's jurisdictional statute, for example, says that the CFC has jurisdiction
over any claim against the federal government to recover damages founded on the
Constitution, a statute, or a regulation, among other things. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000).
49. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922).
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When challenging a government entity's denial or delay in the
permitting process, landowners point to the inherent inequity in a
process that deprives an individual of constitutionally protected rights.
In other words, denials of permits or delays in the permitting process are
likely to make individuals feel "singled out" rather than feeling as
50
though they are part of a long-term plan that affects everyone equally.
A "reciprocity of advantage" is harder to justify when individuals bear
the brunt of the restriction. 51 Thus, the policy objectives behind
protecting slow, deliberate assessments of regional plans lose strength
when applied to an individual property owner. The Supreme Court
compared permitting processes with bans on development:, "the interest
in protecting the decisional process is even stronger when an agency is
developing a regional plan than when it is considering a permit for a
single parcel." 52 Landowners would argue that findings of takings might
therefore be easier to justify in the permitting context.
Yet there are strong counterarguments that weigh against the
angry landowner's contentions. Notably, the federal statutes that require
permits as a prerequisite for development often address the most
critically endangered resources, whether the resources are water, air,
land, or flora and fauna.5 3 Permits are usually required in places of
heightened concern such as areas that are ecologically fragile or easily
compromised. Permits in these situations ensure, through affirmative
steps, that each and every attempt to develop will be scrutinized and
that appropriate safeguards will be adhered to. In contrast, the primary
function of a moratorium is to simply maintain the status quo through
inaction.
D. The "Extraordinary Delay" Factor
Outright denials of permits are not frequently litigated.
However, plaintiffs often bring suit due to the delay in obtaining a
permit. Because of the delays inherent in a permitting process,
50. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341. Interestingly, the Court in Tahoe-Sierra noted that one
distinction between physical and regulatory takings was that "physical appropriations are
relatively rare, easily identified, and usually represent a greater affront to individual
property rights," while regulations stem from a public program meant to "promote the
common good." Id. at 321-24 (quoting from Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). If the Court considered physical appropriations a "greater affront"
to individuals, perhaps it might draw a similar distinction between regulations that affect
individuals more than other regulations (for example, individual permits as opposed to
moratoria).
51. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 341.
52. Id. at 304.
53. See statutes cited supra note 44.
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developers allege temporary regulatory takings for the temporary loss of
use of their land. The Court of Federal Claims often hears these suits,
because they are brought against the federal government as the result of
a permit requirement in a federal statute. 54
Prior to the Tahoe-Sierra case, the Court of Federal Claims and
the Federal Circuit employed a test of "extraordinary delay" to assess
whether a takings claim for a permit delay was viable.5 5 In other words,
a takings claim was not ripe for review unless the government had
denied a permit. 56 If the government had not denied a permit request,
the firmly-held rule was that only "extraordinary delays" would justify a
takings allegation. 57 "Extraordinary delay" has been a component of
takings cases for most of the century. An early case noted that "[m]ere
fluctuations in value during the process of governmental decision
making, absent extraordinary delay, are 'incidents of ownership. They
cannot be considered as a "taking" in the constitutional sense."' 58
After the Tahoe-Sierra case, these courts continued to utilize this
test of extraordinary delay but placed more emphasis on it than they had
before. In fact, post-Tahoe-Sierracases from the CFC and Federal Circuit
suggest that this element has become a dispositive one, and that
plaintiffs cannot reach their Penn Central argument without first showing
an "extraordinary delay." Several CFC decisions cited Tahoe-Sierrafor the
proposition that an extraordinary delay in the permitting process,
coupled with bad faith on the part of the government, will result in a
compensable taking. 59 The notion of "extraordinary delay" in these cases
is nothing new. However, the use of this requirement as a dispositive
element is a new and important development in takings jurisprudence in

54. See statutes cited supranote 44.
55. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225, 263 n.9 (1980); Danforth v. United States, 308
U.S. 271, 285 (1939).
56. Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 n.9; Danforth, 308 U.S. at 285; see also United States v.
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
57. See Fed. Circuit Bar Ass'n, Cases and Recent Developments, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 331, 333
(2002).
58. Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 n.9 (quoting Danforth, 308 U.S. at 285).
59. Fed. Circuit Bar Ass'n, Takings Claim Premised on a Denialof a Permit to Fill Wetlands
Is Not Rendered Unripe by Issuance of a ProvisionalPermit DuringLitigation, but Permit Issuance
May Affect Takings Analysis by Rendering Any Taking Temporary, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 139, 141
(2003); see also Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Tahoe-Sierra has
also prompted the CFC to recognize the parcel as a whole as the relevant parcel, upholding
the principle articulated by the Supreme Court; see, e.g., Walcek v. United States, 303 F.3d
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 100 (Fed. Cl. 2002);
Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 717 (Fed. Cl. 2002). For a pre-Tahoe-Sierra
CFC-equivalent of the Lucas decision, see Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394
(1989).
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the CFC. Before discussing this in more depth, it will be useful to review
the Supreme Court's decision in Tahoe-Sierra.
V. RETURN TO THE PENN CENTRAL BALANCING TEST: THE
TAHOE-SIERRA DECISION
A. The Dispute over the Moratoria
The Supreme Court's decision in Tahoe-Sierrafocused on the use
of moratoria on development in the implementation of a comprehensive
land use plan. Development of the Lake Tahoe area experienced an
upsurge in the 1950s and 1960s. The lake's famously crystal-blue waters
and striking clarity drew an onslaught of new developers to the region
over the next few decades. In this era of rapid development, the lake
experienced an increase in "nutrient loading," which clouded the water
60
significantly.
Specialists attributed the additional nutrients to the steep slope
of the basin and the increased amount of impervious coverage of the
land, such as concrete, asphalt, and building foundations. Where
impervious material covered soil, precipitation gathered and pooled in
certain areas. This in turn created forceful runoff from developed areas
on steeper slopes in the Basin. Specialists identified the increased runoff
and corresponding erosive effect as the principle cause of the muddying
of the lake's waters. In response, the areas on steeper slopes, or those
located closest to the lake's shores, were identified as Stream
Environment Zones (SEZs).61 These critical zones became the focus of
subsequent conservation efforts. Because the Basin straddled two states
and a variety of jurisdictions, the legislatures of both Nevada and
California jointly adopted the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact in 1968.
The compact created the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) to
oversee and regulate the development of the area. 62 The compact also
articulated the states' mutual goal of protecting the Basin and conserving
the area's natural resources.
After a bumpy start, the compact was amended in 1980. The
amended compact redefined the objectives of TRPA, ordering it to
63
A
articulate "regional environmental threshold carrying capacities."
It
further
objectives.
TRPA's
for
was
outlined
series of strict deadlines
60. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 307-08.
61. Id. at 308-09.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 310. Carrying capacities are generally understood to represent the theoretical
maximum number of individuals that a specific environment or habitat can support.
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instructed TRPA to adopt a regional plan consistent with its
determination of carrying capacities within one year of assessing those
capacities. The compact notably included a finding by the Nevada and
California legislatures that, "in order to make effective the regional plan
as revised by [TRPA], it is necessary to halt temporarily works of
development in the region which might otherwise absorb the entire
capability of the region for further development or direct it out of
harmony with the ultimate plan." 64
The first moratorium arose out of TRPA's duty to implement the
regional plan. Acknowledging that it was not able to meet the compact's
deadlines, in 1981 TRPA enacted the first of the two challenged
moratoria. Ordinance 81-5 halted development in the SEZ lands and
certain other parcels in the state of California. It took effect on August 24,
1981, and was scheduled to continue until the adoption of the permanent
regional plan. 65 After two years, TRPA was still unable to propose a
regional plan that complied with the strictures of the compact. As a
result, TRPA adopted Resolution 83-21. This directive halted "all project
reviews and approvals, including the acceptance of new proposals." 66
The moratorium remained in effect until the regional plan was
ultimately adopted on April 26, 1984.67 Together, Ordinance 81-5 and
Resolution 83-21 suspended construction on all SEZ lands in the Basin
for 32 months. Some sensitive non-SEZ lands in California and Nevada
were also affected.
Even when the regional plan was finally adopted in 1984,
troubles continued. The day of its adoption, the State of California filed
an action to enjoin implementation of the regional plan, asserting that it
failed to propose sufficiently strict land use regulations to protect the
Basin. The district court agreed and granted the injunction, 68 which was
upheld by the Court of Appeals. 69 The injunction continued until 1987,
when a revised plan was approved and adopted.

64. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 310 (quoting the amendment made to the Tahoe Regional
Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233, 3243 (codified at CAL. GOVT CODE
ANN, § 66801 (West Supp. 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. § 277.200 (1980)).
65. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 311.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See U.S. Supreme Court Petitioner's Brief at 7, Tahoe-Sierra (No. 00-1167, 2001 WL
1692011).
69. Id. Before reaching the U.S. Supreme Court, the Tahoe-Sierra case had resulted in
many decisions published by the district court in Nevada and the Ninth Circuit. For a
complete list of cites to those opinions, see the district court opinion dealing with the issue
of whether the defendants had waived their right to raise the correct statute of limitations
as an affirmative defense at Tahoe-Sierra, 992 F. Supp. 1218, 1219 n.1 (1998).
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Shortly after the 1984 plan was adopted, the Tahoe Sierra
Preservation Council (TSPC), together with approximately four hundred
individual landowners, brought suit against TRPA, alleging a taking of
private property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The individual landowners
claimed that they had purchased their land with the intent of
constructing single-family homes prior to the implementation of the 1980
compact. 70 Those that purchased their land after 1972 had already been
subject to the regulations associated with SEZ land and other sensitive
zones. 71 Specifically, the petitioners identified the two-year Ordinance
81-5, the eight-month Resolution 83-21, and the 1984 regional plan as the
causes of their woes. 72
B. The District Court Decision
The lower court decision illustrates the confusion surrounding
takings jurisprudence in regulatory, temporary takings claims. The
District Court for the District of Nevada used no fewer than three
different tests in reaching its decision. The court began its Fifth
Amendment analysis by identifying the case as a regulatory takings case
and proceeded to evaluate the facts under the Agins v. City of Tiburon
two-prong test.73 The court first weighed whether the moratoria
substantially advanced a legitimate state interest (pursuant to the first
prong of the Agins test), and determined that this prong was satisfied. 74
It subsequently evaluated the facts under Agins' second prong: whether
the regulation denied the owners economically viable use of their land.
Here, the court ran into some complications. It acknowledged that the
moratoria might have effected a "partial taking," and that the series of
partial takings might have amounted to a "total taking." 75 In order to
answer the second question posed by Agins, the court rather awkwardly
looked to the Penn Central balancing test, shoehorning the two tests into
one analysis.

70. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 311.
71. Id.
72. Id. The claim based on the 1984 plan was dismissed. The district court found that
the injuries resulting to the plaintiffs during the post-1984 plan period were the result of
the California injunction rather than the plan itself. Plaintiffs later asserted a claim based on
the 1987 plan, which was dismissed because the statute of limitations had passed. Id. at 313.
73. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1238 (D. Nev. 1999); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980).
74. Tahoe-Sierra,34 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
75. Id.at 1240.
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After weighing the economic effect on the landowner,
interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of
the government action, (as suggested by Penn Central) the court
determined that the regulation did not deny the landowners
economically viable use of their land; thus there was no taking. 76 Among
the factors the court found determinative were the temporary nature of
the moratoria, the lengthy delays between land purchase and
construction in the Basin, and the failure of the plaintiffs to provide
evidence of specific harm. 77
However, the court did not stop there. Instead, it continued in its
analysis to evaluate the facts according to Lucas. While TRPA argued that
the moratoria represented reasonable efforts to plan development in the
Basin, the court disagreed. Although the court acknowledged that the
property retained some value for the duration of the moratoria, it arrived
at the conclusion that the plaintiffs had been "temporarily deprived of all
economically viable use of their land." 78 As such, TRPA's action
amounted to a categorical taking under the Lucas rule. The court
explained that the failure of the moratoria to provide explicit termination
dates weighed heavily in their decision. The court recognized the
difficulty of its decision when it considered whether all moratoria on
development should automatically constitute takings. Accordingly, the
court dismissed the complaint under the 1984 and 1987 plans, but found
that a taking occurred in the 32-months of moratoria imposed; it ordered
TRPA to pay damages to a number of the plaintiffs as a result. 79
C. The Ninth Circuit Decision
In the wake of the district court decision, the plaintiffs appealed
the dismissal of their allegations based on the 1984 and 1987 plans.
Notably, however, the plaintiffs failed to challenge on appeal the district
court's findings or their use of the Penn Central factors. 80 In fact, the
plaintiffs expressly stated on appeal that they did not dispute whether
8
the moratoria amounted to a taking under the Penn Central approach. 1
This omission would prove significant in light of the Supreme Court's
final decision. The defendants, meanwhile, challenged the takings
decision. The main issue on appeal, then, was whether the district court

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1245 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1255.
Tahoe-Sierra,216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 773.
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properly used the Lucas categorical rule in the context of a temporary
regulatory vestriction on land use.
The court of appeals reversed the lower court decision, holding
that the impact on the landowners had been temporary, and therefore
not "categorical" within the meaning of Lucas.82 The court acknowledged
that property interests are multidimensional and consist of physical,
functional, and temporal elements. However, upholding the Penn Central
mandate that the parcel be considered as a whole, the court declined to
sever those dimensions in evaluating a takings claim.8 3 The landowners
in this case had not been denied all productive use of the entire parcel.
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the moratoria implemented by
4
TRPA were "widespread and well established" forms of regulation.8
The Ninth Circuit in its opinion held that the ad hoc balancing under
Penn Central was the appropriate test in this case. Plaintiffs, undoubtedly
crestfallen at their failure to dispute the applicability of Penn Central on
appeal, applied for rehearing, which was denied. The appeal to the
Supreme Court followed shortly thereafter.
D. The Supreme Court Decision
Constrained by the narrow issues on appeal,8 5 the Supreme
Court did not decide whether a compensable taking had occurred under
the Penn Central factors. Instead, the Court simply affirmed the Ninth
Circuit's refusal to apply the Lucas categorical rule to the facts of this case
and identified the Penn Central framework as the appropriate inquiry
given the circumstances of the case.8 6 Justice Stevens wrote for the 6-3
majority. Although the central holdings were that (1) the 32-month
moratoria did not constitute a per se taking and (2) temporary regulatory
takings are to be evaluated under Penn Central, Justice Stevens also
clarified some key concepts that had been muddled in light of the
uncertain state of takings law.

82. Id. at 774.
83. Id.
84. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
319 (2002).
85. Id. at 331-36. The Court seemed to focus on the procedural posture of the case. For
example, it listed seven arguments that the plaintiffs had not made and briefly evaluated
whether they would have been successful. The seven hypothetical scenarios might be used
by future petitioners as rough guidelines. See infra note 103.
86. Id. at 331-33.
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Notably, the Court drew a definitive line between physical
takings and regulatory takings. 87 In its discussion, the Court emphasized
that the two physical and regulatory takings should not be evaluated
using the same test. Justice Stevens wrote:
This longstanding distinction between acquisitions of
property for public use, on the one hand, and regulations
prohibiting private uses, on the other, makes it
inappropriate to treat cases involving physical takings as
controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim that
88
there has been a "regulatory taking," and vice versa.
In case it was not already clear, the Court went on to say that "we do not
Apply our precedent from the physical takings context to regulatory
takings claims." 89 This was a careful and deliberate attempt to rein in the
scope of the Lucas decision. 90
The Supreme Court's distinction between physical and
regulatory takings is important for another reason: physical takings
enjoy a presumption of compensation, while regulatory takings require a
much higher standard. The Court restated the general rule that, "[w]hen
the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for
some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former
owner, regardless of whether the interest that is taken constitutes an
entire parcel or merely a part thereof." 91 The Court then declined to
extend this categorical duty to cases involving regulatory cases, stating
that "[t]he first category of cases requires courts to apply a clear rule; the
second necessarily entails complex factual assessments of the purposes
and economic effects of governmental actions." 92 Temporary physical
takings, therefore, trigger this categorical duty to compensate the owner,
regardless of whether the entire parcel or merely a part of the parcel is
taken. Claims of temporary regulatory takings, on the other hand, do not

87. Id. at 322-23. This in and of itself had a significant impact on lower tribunals. Idaho
courts, for example, until Tahoe-Sierra, had been using the test for physical takings in
regulatory contexts. Edward F. Wroe & Andrew Wright, Inverse Condemnation in Idaho (In
the Wake of the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Case), ADVOC. (IDAHo), Nov. 2002, at 22, 23.
88. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323. In clarifying the difference between the two strands of
nalysis, Justice Stevens pointed out that the elements of "physical appropriation" and
"public use" are not components of a regulatory taking. Id.
89. Id. at 323-24.
90. Id. at 330. The Court pointed out that, in a footnote in the Lucas decision, it had
warned that "the categorical rule would not apply if the diminution in value were 95%
instead of 100%." Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 330 (referring to Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8).
91. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
92. Id. at 323 (quoting Yee v. Esconido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992).
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warrant this presumption of compensation, and instead are subjected to
the ad hoc balancing test articulated by Penn Central.
Despite the Court's relatively narrow holding that a 32-month
moratorium on development will not constitute a temporary per se
taking, the Tahoe-Sierra case was significant because it signaled the
revival of important doctrines in takings jurisprudence. For one thing,
the case represented a shift away from the per se rule of Lucas and
embraced the ad hoc approach of Penn Central. Quoting Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Palazzolo, the Court wrote, "[We resist]
the temptation to adopt what amounts to per se rules in either
93
direction."
The Tahoe-Sierra case represents the revival of other important
principles as well. It endorsed a broader understanding of the meaning
of "parcel as a whole" and what constitutes the "denominator" of the
property. Relying on Justice Brennan's opinion in Penn Central, the Court
noted that, "even though multiple factors are relevant in the analysis of
regulatory takings claims, in such cases we must focus on the 'parcel as a
whole. ' " 94 In this sense, too, it represented a shift away from Lucas and
the categorical approach. In focusing on the "parcel as a whole," the
Court rejected the landowners' argument that there had been a
"conceptual severance." 95 The Court recognized that a regulation might
restrict a landowner's use of one stick in the bundle of rights, but that it
would not preclude the use of other sticks in the bundle. The decision
suggests that, as long as the parcel as a whole retains some value, there
will be no finding of a temporary regulatory taking. The Court implicitly
recognized that a temporary prohibition on the development of land in
the present does not strip the land of all its value. Rather, the landowner
retains a valuable interest in the future right to use and enjoy the land.
Because those "sticks" in the bundle of rights are not usurped by
temporary restrictions, there can be no taking. Quoting Andrus,96 the
Court stated that, "'where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property
rights, the destruction of one 'strand' in the bundle is not a taking."' 97

93. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
94. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 318. It also acknowledged the fact that no bright-line test
exists and emphasized that the articulation of such clear-cut tests are better designed by
Congress. Id. at 335.
95. Id. at 331. Tahoe-Sierra's endorsement of the "parcel as a whole" as the relevant
parcel in temporary takings cases has been uniformly followed by later cases. This
approach will eschew courts from too quickly using categorical, Lucas-like analyses and
will militate against findings that temporary takings are compensable.
96. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
97. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 327 (quoting Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66). It appears that only
one court since then has taken the rogue position that the "parcel as a whole" is not the
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The Court acknowledged that exceptions might exist, but limited them to
Lucas-like cases of "extraordinary" situations, where "no productive or
8
economically beneficial use of land is permitted." 9
Related to the parcel as a whole discussion, the Supreme Court
also defined "interests" in real property as including both geographic
and temporal dimensions. Citing the Restatement of Property,99 the Court
noted that "an interest in real property is defined by the metes and
bounds that describe its geographical dimensions and the term of years
that describes the temporal aspect of the owner's interest." 100 Tahoe-Sierra
indicated that courts should evaluate many different considerations, "one
of which is the length of delay."101In order to evaluate the "parcel as a
whole," the Court noted that both the geographical and the temporal
dimensions must be evaluated. The Court reasoned that
a permanent deprivation of the owner's use of the entire
area is a taking of the 'parcel as a whole', whereas a
temporary restriction that merely causes a diminution in
value is not. Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered
valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because
the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is
102
lifted.
This is strong language and, if it stood alone, would appear to
close the door on temporary regulatory takings. However, the Court
stopped short of deciding the case on this principle. Indeed, rather than
foreclosing the possibility of succeeding on temporary regulatory takings
claims, the Court examined seven alternative theories that might have
03
been argued and under which the claimants might have prevailed.
proper denominator. See Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751
(Pa. 2002) (relying on a state law that explicitly recognized three separate estates); see also
Matthew J. Bauer, Absent Physical Invasion, Governmental Interference with Private Property
Will Not Likely Violate the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause: Machipongo Land and Coal
Company, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 619 (2003).
98. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S at 330 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1017 (1992)).
99. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 7-9 (1936).
100. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331-32.
101. Id. at 338 n.34 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 332 (emphasis added). This language is strongly worded and appears to
foreclose the possibility of succeeding on a Fifth Amendment claim where a regulation
imposes temporary restrictions on use. However, the Court stopped short of so ruling in
this case, instead falling back on the Penn Centralbalancing test as the appropriate inquiry.
Note also that the majority's focus on "value" of the estate rather than the use of the estate
drew criticism from Justices Thomas and Scalia in their dissent.
103. Sometimes called the "hypothetical seven," these alternative theories were (1)
adoption of a categorical rule; (2) articulation of a narrower rule, allowing for takings in all
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Several of these theories addressed the issue of time and delay and
whether such temporally based claims can ever justify compensation.
Only three of the seven alternative theories would have applied in the
Tahoe-Sierracase, and the Court rejected all three in turn.
E. Dicta in Tahoe-Sierra:Alternative Theories Considered and Rejected
First, the Court considered the adoption of a categorical rule that
would require courts to find a taking wherever government
"temporarily deprive[d] an owner of all economically viable use of her
property." 1 4 This was rejected because (a) it would apply to the many
normal delays that are occasioned by permits, ordinances, and variances;
(b) the rule would require changes in state practice that have long been
accepted as proper exercises of the police power; (c) routine
governmental processes would become prohibitively expensive; and (d)
categorical rules are best left to the legislative branch of government.
Secondly, the Court weighed whether it should fashion a
narrower rule, which would cover "all temporary land-use restrictions
except those 'normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in
zoning ordinances, variances, and the like. '" 105 This was similarly
rejected. Although such a rule would have a less severe impact than a
categorical rule, the Court noted that it would still result in "serious
106
financial constraints on the planning process."
Finally, the Court considered implementing a grace period
(using the example of a one-year deadline), after which time the government would be required to compensate a landowner. This theory was
rejected mostly on public policy grounds. The Court reasoned that
government officials would be pressured to make hasty decisions within
the grace period, and landowners would be under similar pressure to
cases except those normal delays in permitting and zoning ordinances; (3) a bright-line rule
that would require compensation to kick in after a "grace period" of a year; (4)
characterization of the restrictions as "rolling moratoria" that became the functional
equivalent of a taking; (5) a determination that the TRPA "stalled" the process and
therefore acted in bad faith; (6) a decision that the moratoria did not substantially advance
a legitimate state interest; or (7) the utilization of an "as applied" rather than a facial
challenge to the moratoria. The Supreme Court noted that, because of the procedural
posture of the case, theories (4) through (7) were unavailable. However, the Court did
evaluate theories (1) through (3) and dismissed each in turn. See id. at 333-40.
104. Id. at 333. The Court stated at the outset that these alternative tests were being
considered in the interest of "fairness and justice," perhaps a reference to one of the
foundational principles under the Fifth Amendment.
105. Id. (quoting First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)).
106. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 337.
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quickly develop their land before a plan was enacted that governed it.
This, the Court guessed, would result in "inefficient and ill-conceived
growth."107
F. Limitations on the Tahoe-SierraHolding
The cases decided by the Federal Circuit must be read in light of
the limitations of the Tahoe-Sierra holding. Because Tahoe-Sierra
addressed a local government agency's moratorium on development,
some would argue that Tahoe-Sierra's application is limited to moratoria
mandated by state or local government agencies. As states enjoy broad
10 8
state-imposed
deference when acting pursuant to their police powers,
moratoria may be more immune from Fifth Amendment takings than
federal regulation. Also, because moratoria apply broadly, they affect a
wider range of people and affect each one equally rather than singling
anyone out. As a cautionary note, Tahoe-Sierra should be read within its
context; many argue that these "state moratoria" cases are not
compelling Fifth Amendment cases and will only infrequently result in a
finding of a taking. In contrast, the CFC reviews mostly as-applied
challenges, many of them involving delays in permitting where a federal
agency is the defendant. Such an inherently individualized process
should arguably be evaluated with more scrutiny than moratoria that
apply to a wider group of constituents.

107. Id. at 339. There were two dissenting opinions: one written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined, and another written by Justice
Thomas and joined by Justice Scalia. In the first of the dissenting opinions, Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that the moratoria had actually extended for six years, rather than only
32 months, and that a six-year moratorium was far in excess of any justifiable control by the
state. Id. at 345-46. Chief Justice Rehnquist also argued that the majority had
misinterpreted Lucas and focused improperly on the regulation's impact on the value of
land rather than the regulation's impact on the owners' use of the land. Justices Thomas
and Scalia, in the second dissent, rejected the majority's reliance on the "parcel as a whole"
approach. Id. at 355. Using First English as support, they argued that a regulation that
prohibits all productive use of land should be compensable, regardless of whether the
property owner will be able to later develop the property after the regulation is lifted.
108. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978) (noting that
where a State "reasonably conclude[s] that 'the health, safety, morals, or general welfare'
would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land," the government
does not owe the landowner compensation). See generally Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,414-15 (1922).
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VI. CASES DECIDED BY THE CFC AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
IN THE WAKE OF TAHOE-SIERRA
A. Jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims
The Court of Federal Claims, 109 with appeals to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, has "the most active and expansive
takings docket within the federal court system."110 Historically, the CFC
and the Federal Circuit have arrived at "idiosyncratic results " "' in
takings cases, resulting in "little doctrinal coherence" 112 in these forums.
During the early 1990s, the CFC exhibited a trend of favoring plaintiffs in
takings claims, as demonstrated by the significant number of such claims
decided in favor of the landowners. 113 Notably, many of these cases dealt

109. The focus of this article is decisions from the CFC, but occasionally cases from the
appellate division of this tribunal, the Federal Circuit, will be discussed as well.
110. David F. Coursen, The Takings Jurisprudenceof the Court of Federal Claims and the
Federal Circuit, 29 ENVTL. L. 821, 822 (1999). Mr. Coursen has worked in the Office of
General Counsel of the Environmental Protection Agency as senior takings counsel and as
an Assistant Attorney General in the Appellate Division of the Oregon Department of
Justice as a takings litigator. Id. at 821 n.al. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (2000) (defining
the CFC's jurisdiction). The CFC's enabling statute provides that
[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the
United States Court of Federal Claims, of... [alny other civil action or claim
against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the
United States....
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2000). Accordingly, cases involving suits against the federal government are heard in this forum. The CFC is an Article I tribunal, which precludes it from
reviewing the actions of Article III courts. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296
F.3d 1339, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2002). CFC jurisdiction is determined by the underlying relief
sought rather than the parties' cause of action. 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 2308 (2002).
The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over CFC cases. 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a)(3) (2000).
111. Coursen, supra note 110, at 822.
112. Id. at 823. The Court has also been criticized for being too conservative and
"ideological" in its approach to takings cases. Id. at 829. See also Douglas T. Kendall &
Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A CriticalAnalysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far,
25 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 509 (1998); Victoria Slind-Flor, Federal Circuit Judged Flawed,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3, 1998, at Al. Compounding the problem is the fact that Congress has
attempted to legislate standards for just compensation and redefine the proper role of the
CFC in addressing regulatory conduct by the government. David F. Coursen, Property
Rights Legislation: A Survey of Federal and State Assessment and Compensation Measures, [26
News & Analysis] ENVTL. L. REP. 10,239 (May 1996).
113. Coursen, supra note 110, at 828 (noting that over half of the decisions in 1990 were
decided in favor of the plaintiffs).
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with environmental regulations. 1 4 However, that trend came to a halt
after the Lucas decision. In fact, the trend reversed; after Lucas, the
government has been much more successful in takings litigation. In fact,
the government prevailed in 90 percent of reported decisions between
1993 and 1996.115
In the wake of the Tahoe-Sierra decision, the CFC appears to be
supplementing the ad hoc, Penn Central balancing test approach with an
additional element of "extraordinary delay," thereby making it more
difficult for plaintiff landowners to prevail on Fifth Amendment
temporary regulatory takings claims. This suggests that there is a trend
growing in U.S. courts to disfavor plaintiff developers and landowners
in temporary regulatory takings litigation. The logical inference is that
this tribunal has implicitly endorsed the use of interim development
controls and delays as a function of sensible growth and environmental
protection.
B. The Additional Requirement of "Extraordinary Delay" Used by the
CFC after Tahoe-Sierra
In at least one CFC case predating Tahoe-Sierra, the court
dissected the meaning of "extraordinary delay" and determined that a
1 16
In Wyatt v.
ten-year delay was not, in and of itself, unreasonable.
United States, a Tennessee office of the Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) of the Department of the Interior
denied the plaintiff a permit after receiving inadequate information in
the application. The court, in reaching the decision that there was no
extraordinary delay, considered the agency's expertise in the area, and
the "significant deference owed to OSM in its processing of plaintiff's
117
permit application."
Plaintiff Wyatt appealed, but, despite repeated attempts to
provide the requested information, the permit was ultimately denied a
second time. Following the second denial, the plaintiff filed suit for a
114. See, e.g., Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Superfund
cleanup project); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(surface mining control and reclamation); United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d
1432, 1435-38 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (restriction on uranium mining); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v.
United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 160 (1990) (wetlands regulation); Yancey v. United States, 915
F.2d 1534, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (turkey quarantine).
115. Coursen, supra note 110, at 828-29. The U.S. Supreme Court has never found a
taking of land when applying the Penn Central test. Id. at 823 n.12.
116. Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1097-1100 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Tabb
Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (standing for the proposition
that a taking occurs only after a delay becomes unreasonable).
117. See Appolo Fuels v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 717, 737 (2002).
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temporary taking. The court, in rendering its decision, acknowledged
that a temporary taking could occur if the government decision-making
process posed an extraordinary delay. However, the court also noted
that the "length of the delay is not necessarily the primary factor to be
considered when determining whether there is an extraordinary
s
government delay." 11
The court also warned that, "[blecause delay is
inherent in complex regulatory permitting schemes, [a court] must
examine the nature of the permitting process as well as the reasons for
any delay." 119 Thus, although the length of the delay is germane, it is not
the only or necessarily the most important factor in the evaluation of a
temporary takings claim. In an even more rigid tone, the court cautioned,
"it is the rare circumstance that [a court] will find a taking based on
extraordinary delay without a showing of bad faith."1 20
Tahoe-Sierra indicated that courts should evaluate many different
considerations, "one of which is the length of delay." 121 Using a strict
interpretation of that phrase, a court might reasonably conclude that it is
not required to evaluate the length of time; instead, it is merely a
discretionary factor that may be evaluated. Interestingly, in some postTahoe-Sierra decisions, the CFC has decided to make the length of time an
obligatory consideration, in addition to the Penn Central factors. 122
Plaintiff landowners will argue that this is decidedly more than what the
Tahoe-Sierra court envisioned. However, government defendants should
contend that Tahoe-Sierra implicitly endorses this approach via its
discussion of policy concerns with respect to planning.
It is unclear whether these courts are simply using the same
analytical framework that they utilized prior to Tahoe-Sierra or whether
this is their interpretation of the Supreme Court case. At least three cases
suggest that it may be the latter: Cane Tennessee, Appolo Fuels, and Cooley.
1. Cane Tennessee Iand II
In Cane Tennessee Inc. v. United States, decided in October 2002,
plaintiffs sued the federal government alleging that the Secretary of the
Interior's designation of land as unsuitable for surface mining was a

118. Wyatt, 271 F.3d at 1098.
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing Tabb Lakes, 10 F.3d at 799).
121. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
339 n.34 (2002) (emphasis added).
122. See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 538 U.S. 906 (2003).

Winter 20051

TEMPORARY REGULATORY TAKINGS

temporary taking of their property. 123 To comply with the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), a landowner or miner
must obtain a permit from the appropriate regulatory authority before
commencing surface mining. 124 In order to receive a permit, the
petitioner must demonstrate that he or she will be able to comply with a
number of environmental requirements. 125 In the meantime, citizens may
petition the regulatory authority to request that an area be designated as
126
unsuitable for such mining.
In this case, the Department of the Interior and the Secretary of
the Interior had considered an unsuitability petition regarding plaintiffs'
property. The Secretary ultimately decided that the property was
unsuitable for surface mining. As a result of the decision, the Secretary
restricted the plaintiffs' right to mine embedded coal, first on a
temporary basis and then permanently. Plaintiffs argued that, because
the unsuitability process resulted in a moratorium on mining, they were
entitled to compensation. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the "four
year, eight-month, twelve day mining moratorium...'was just one link in
a sixteen-year chain of events by which mining Cane's coal estates has
been forestalled....127
Defendants countered this argument by pointing out that the
plaintiffs had failed to plead the required element of "extraordinary
delay." 128 Plaintiffs responded that the Penn Central test did not require a
showing of extraordinary delay, and that Tahoe-Sierra instructed courts

123. Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 100 (2002); see also Bass Enters. Prod.
Co. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 400 (2002).
124. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (2002).
125. Id. §§ 1256, 1260.
126. Id. § 1272(c).
127. Cane Tenn., 54 Fed. Cl. at 110.
128. Defendants cited Dufau v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 156 (1990), for the proposition
that "extraordinary delay" is a required element. Cane Tenn., 54 Fed. Cl. at 111 (citations
omitted). The defendants also argued that the moratorium was merely preliminary action
on the part of the government. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 803 (Fed. Cir.
1993)
Danforth and Agins hold that the government is not responsible for
diminution in value caused by preliminary activity... While Danforth and
Agins leave open the possibility that a taking may occur by reason of
"extraordinary delay" in governmental decisionmaking, nothing in case
law suggests that unreasonable delay converts the first preliminary act
into the date of the taking....Thus, only after the delay becomes
unreasonable would a taking begin....
Id. (citations omitted).
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to assess several considerations, "only one of which is the length of
29
delay."1
The court in Cane Tennessee, however, pointed out that the Boise
Cascade130 decision, written shortly after Tahoe-Sierra, did appear to
require a showing of extraordinary delay. The court wrote,
extraordinary delay is an essential element of regulatory
takings cases.... The Federal Circuit was explicit in Boise,
stating "whether a taking occurred should be analyzed
under Penn Central. This does not affect the longstanding
rule that, absent denial of a permit, only extraordinary
delays in the permitting process ripen into a compensable
taking. Whether a particular extraordinary delay
constitutes a taking is governed by Penn Central, just as are
temporary moratoria." 131
Plaintiffs then attempted to characterize their case as one
involving "rolling moratoria." Their argument was that the case fell
outside of the framework of Boise and should be examined in light of the
Supreme Court's discussion of the "hypothetical seven" in Tahoe-Sierra.
The plaintiffs contended that the unsuitability petition process was one
part of a series of rolling moratoria that became the functional equivalent
of a permanent taking. The court seemed to acknowledge this possibility
and declined to decide whether the rule of extraordinary delay applied
to this case. Instead, the court remanded for further development under
the Penn Central factors.
The court thus reserved its decision of whether "extraordinary
delay" was required for another day. That time arrived when the court
reexamined the case in Cane Tennessee II, decided in June 2003.132 This
129. Cane Tenn., 54 Fed. Cl. at 111 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 338 n.34 (2002).
130. Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Boise
Cascade is not discussed at any length in this article because the Federal Circuit decided
that the regulatory takings claims there were not ripe for review. Its discussion of the
extraordinary delay factor, while informative, was ancillary to its holding and therefore of
limited relevance for the analysis discussed herein.
131. Cane Tenn., 54 Fed. Cl. at 111 (quoting Boise Cascade Corp., 296 F.3d at 1352); see also
Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 400 (2002) (reversing earlier decision on
motion for reconsideration and now holding that lessees who were denied permission to
drill by the Bureau of Land Management did not suffer a taking of their leases that
warranted compensation). The earlier decision had ruled that plaintiffs were entitled to just
compensation for the temporary taking of their oil and gas leases and entered judgment for
$1,137,808 plus costs and fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 4654(c)). Bass Enters. Prod. Co., 54 Fed.
Cl. at 402.
132. Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 115 (2003).
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time, the plaintiff again argued that extraordinary delay was not an
essential element of a temporary takings claim, and, alternatively, that
133
There, the
they should prevail under a "rolling moratoria" claim.
defendants responded that, according to Tahoe-Sierra and the Boise
Cascade cases, it was clear that, "in a temporary takings claim that is
premised on that phase of a regulatory decision-making process that
precedes a final decision by the government agency in question,
extraordinary delay during that process is required to ripen the temporary
takings claim." 134 The plaintiffs countered that Tahoe-Sierra required the
use of the Penn Central factors in temporary takings cases, and that the
135
The
"length of delay is only one factor to take into consideration."
Court flatly rejected that argument.
More importantly, the court held that a finding of extraordinary
delay was an essential element of a temporary takings claim. Quoting
Cooley v. United States (discussed below), which had just been decided by
the Federal Circuit, the court held that "plaintiffs must show there was
extraordinary delay to prevail on their temporary takings claim."136 Even
more significantly, the court went a step further and held that, "[b)efore
the court can analyze the facts of this case utilizing the Penn Central
factors, plaintiffs must first show that there was unreasonable delay in
the petition process."1 37 Thus, the CFC in Cane Tennessee II held that, at
least in permitting cases, a showing of extraordinary delay is a threshold,
and a dispositive, issue. The CFC thus inferred from Tahoe-Sierra an
additional element in the Penn Central equation.
2. Appolo Fuels, Inc.
Other CFC and Federal Circuit cases have been decided using a
similar rationale. Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, decided in December
2002, also dealt with an unsuitability petition. There too, the restriction in
question was the decision by the government to prevent surface mining
38
on their property after evaluating a citizens' unsuitability petition. The
government designated a portion of the plaintiffs' property as unsuitable
133. Id. at 118.
134. Id. at 131 (quoting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 50) (emphasis
added).
135. Id. at 131-32 (citations omitted). The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the
"rolling moratoria" in the present case were the functional equivalent of a permanent
taking. The court acknowledged that Tahoe-Sierra,in dicta, had endorsed such an approach
to takings, but noted that the Supreme Court had refrained from providing any guidance
about how to evaluate such a claim. Id. at 132.
136. Id. at 132 (discussing Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
137. Id. at 133 (emphasis added).
138. Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 717 (2002).
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for mining because of its proximity to a creek watershed. However, the
Office of Surface Mining (OSM) did not make its decision for one year,
while the citizen petition was processed. The plaintiffs alleged
permanent and temporary regulatory takings. To buttress their claims,
the plaintiffs pointed out that the OSM is required by statute to render
decisions on citizen petitions under section 1272 within a 12-month
period.139
Defendants in Appolo Fuels argued that the Federal Circuit, "in
addition to the Penn Central criteria, requires plaintiff to show
'extraordinary delay on the part of the permitting agency' to establish
that a temporary taking occurred." 140 Defendants further argued that a
delay of only one year was not sufficient to meet the standard. The court
began its analysis by recognizing that Tahoe-Sierra mandated application
of the Penn Central factors to temporary regulatory restrictions. But it
also agreed with the defendants that, "absent denial of the permit, only
an extraordinary delay in the permitting process can give rise to a
compensable taking."141 The court then went on to explore the meaning
of "extraordinary delay," pointing out that in Wyatt a ten-year delay was
insufficient. The court also found informative the discussion of
"extraordinary delay" in Tabb Lakes. There, the Federal Circuit had
pointed out that "delay in the permitting process may be attributable to
the applicant as well as the government" 142 and that "it is the rare
circumstance that [a court] will find a taking based on extraordinary
delay without a showing of bad faith." 143 After considering the
precedent, the court in Appolo Fuels determined that the one-year delay
did not constitute a temporary regulatory taking. Because the court
determined there was no extraordinary delay, it never reached the Penn
Central factors. Thus, once again, the element of "extraordinary delay"
was dispositive.
3. Cooley v. United States
If any doubt remained, Cooley v. United States settled the
matter.1 " In Cooley, the plaintiffs were property owners who brought
suit against the government after the Army Corps of Engineers denied
139. Id. at 736.
140. Id.
141. Id. (quoting Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
142. Appolo Fuels, 54 Fed. CI. at 737 (quoting Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d
796, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
143. Id.
144. Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Winter 20051

TEMPORARY REGULATORY TAKINGS

their request for a permit to fill a wetland. Plaintiff Cooley had hoped to
construct hotels, restaurants, and other commercial buildings in
Minnesota. When he began securing permits for development, the Corps
informed him that he would need a permit under the Clean Water Act
145
Cooley spent the next
because most of the site consisted of wetlands.
three years filing applications for a wetlands fill permit. The Corps
ultimately denied the permit and Cooley brought suit alleging a
permanent and categorical taking of his property. During the litigation,
the Corps offered to issue Cooley a provisional permit. Cooley turned it
down. 146 The CFC decided that he had suffered a categorical taking and
147
that his land was worth 98.8% less than it would have been otherwise,
148
and awarded Cooley approximately $2 million in damages. The Corps
appealed, and the case advanced to the Federal Circuit.
In April 2003, the Federal Circuit vacated the CFC's finding of a
categorical taking, because, although Cooley had lost a substantial
149
amount of the value of his property, he had not lost it all. Because "the
record shows that the 1993 denial apparently destroyed less than all of
150
The
Cooley's property value, [it] constitutes a non-categorical taking."
the
instructing
CFC,
the
to
case
the
remanded
Federal Circuit court
factors.
Central
Penn
the
under
claim
lower court to assess the takings
Notably, the Cooley court further reaffirmed the Cane Tennessee and
Appolo Fuels decisions, holding that a showing of "extraordinary delay"
5
is required in temporary takings cases.' ' As a subsequent case noted, the
implication from Cooley is that "a finding of extraordinary delay is a
condition precedent to undertaking the Penn Central analysis of whether a
taking had occurred." 152 Therefore, in order for a plaintiff to prevail in a
temporary takings claim, she must demonstrate that there has been an
145. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
146. Ironically, because the provisional permit was issued, the Federal Circuit court was
forced to determine that the taking, if it occurred at all, was only temporary rather than
categorical. Cooley, 324 F.3d at 1305.
147. Id. at 1304; see also Fed. Circuit Bar Ass'n, supra note 59, at 140.
148. Cooley, 324 F.3d at 1301.
149. Interestingly, the court also stated that there would be no distinction made
between permitting cases and other situations in which a government entity has affected a
landowner's ability to use his property. This appears to be in accordance with what the
majority in Tahoe-Sierra meant when they wrote that "defining the property interest taken
in terms of the very regulation being challenged is circular. With property so divided,...the
moratorium and the permit process alike would constitute categorical takings." Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002) (emphasis
added).
150. Cooley, 324 F.3d at 1305.
151. Id. at 1306.
152. Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 115, 132 (2003) (emphasis added)
(citing Boise Cascade and Wyatt).
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extraordinary delay and she must additionally prevail under the Penn
Central factors. The court also advised the lower court, on remand, to
consider whether the Corps' conduct evinced bad faith, stating that it
would be rare for the court to find "a taking based on extraordinary
delay without a concomitant showing of bad faith." 153
VII. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE POST-TAHOESIERRA CFC AND FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS
The net effect of these CFC and Federal Circuit cases is that it
will be virtually impossible for future plaintiff landowners to succeed
using a theory of temporary regulatory takings. This is a good sign for all
government entities, whether federal, state or local, because it signals
judicial support for restraints on unchecked development. The test is no
longer a straightforward application of Penn Central. Rather, courts must
now first consider whether an "extraordinary delay" has been
occasioned, and might additionally require a showing of bad faith.' 5 4 To
summarize, the sequence of the analysis for temporary regulatory
restrictions on land use, and specifically those involving permits, 155 is
now the following:
(1) Identify the relevant parcel or the "denominator." If the
entire parcel has been stripped permanently of all economic
and productive use, it is a categorical taking and is entitled
153. Cooley, 324 F.3d at 1306-07.
154. See id. (noting that it would be rare for this court to "find a taking based on
extraordinary delay without a concomitant showing of bad faith").
155. Outside of the scope of this article, but equally fascinating, are the temporary
regulatory takings cases that deal with other types of regulations and legislation. For
example, see Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that
the government committed a regulatory taking by enacting legislation that would have
prohibited mortgage pre-payment). See also Lois G. Jacobs, Owners Win Major Victory in
Federal Circuit on Regulatory Takings Claim in Prepayment Litigation, 31 No. CD-13 HDR
CURRENT DEV. (Human Dev. Rep., New York, N.Y.), June 23, 2003, at 1; Chancellor Manor
v. United States, 331 F.3d 891 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing regulatory takings claims in the
context of federal legislation that prohibited the prepayment of federally subsidized
mortgages for low-income housing). Chancellor Manor was remanded to the CFC for a
determination of whether the Penn Central factors were satisfied. Cases and Recent
Developments, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 295, 296 (2003); Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and its requirement of double
hulls did not effect a regulatory taking of property interests in single-hull barges); Santini
v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the
Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management Service's announcement that the plaintiff's
property was being considered as a candidate for the location of a low-level radioactive
waste disposal facility was not a regulatory taking because it constituted only preliminary
activity).
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to compensation.1 5 6 If only part of the parcel has been
regulated, or if the entire parcel is regulated, but only
temporarily, move on to the next step.
(2) Inquire whether the plaintiff has suffered extraordinary
delay. If there is no showing of extraordinary delay, the
case should be dismissed.
(3) Inquire as to whether bad faith is an issue.
(4) Apply the Penn Central factors.
In light of the Federal Circuit's decisions in the wake of TahoeSierra, some questions remain unresolved. Is this the working test that
the Supreme Court envisioned when it penned Tahoe-Sierra? Tahoe-Sierra
seemed explicit when it reiterated that "[o]ur polestar instead remains
the principles set forth in Penn Central."15 7 Yet Penn Central did not have
15 8
There are a number
an explicit requirement of "extraordinary delay."
of possible explanations for the CFC's judicially created approach to
temporary regulatory takings in the permitting context.
The first possible explanation is that the CFC and Federal Circuit
believe that they are implementing Penn Central in precisely the way that
Tahoe-Sierra suggested, and that the adoption of this additional element
is consistent with Tahoe-Sierra. Perhaps the CFC is drawing from TahoeSierra's discussion of exceptions to the general rule. After all, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that exceptions might exist but limited
them to Lucas-like cases of "extraordinary" situations, where "no

156. Plaintiffs will have to keep in mind that the relevant parcel in regulatory takings
claims is now the "parcel as a whole." Plaintiffs will not succeed using an argument that
the regulated portion of land is the relevant parcel; instead, courts will evaluate the land in
its entirety. See Walcek v. United States, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the
CFC properly considered the entire 14.5 acre property to be the relevant parcel, rather than
the 13.2 acres of wetlands that were regulated, and finding no regulatory taking under
Penn Central).
157. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
326 n.23 (2002) (quoting Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001).
158. In fact, the only one of the three Penn Central factors that might conceivably
embody the "extraordinary delay" element is the second one: the plaintiff's investmentbacked expectations. Still, even this is a stretch. In Palazzolo, Justice O'Connor did discuss
the factor of time. She wrote that courts should consider "'the temporal relationship'
between the regulation's enactment and title acquisition, since 'the regulatory regime in
place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the
reasonableness' of plaintiff's investment-backed expectations." Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634.
But this is relevant only to the lapse of time between a regulation's enactment and the
plaintiff's acquisition of the property.
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productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted." 159 In a
similar vein, the CFC and Federal Circuit may have inferred this
additional requirement from Tahoe-Sierra's discussion of interim
development controls. In that sense, the CFC and Federal Circuit would
be justified in believing that the extra step would have the effect of
frustrating temporary regulatory takings claims and would believe that
the new test was consistent with the policy objectives highlighted by
Tahoe-Sierra.
Stated another way, perhaps the CFC and Federal Circuit have
implicitly recognized the different policy objectives behind moratoria on
the one hand and permitting requirements on the other. After all,
ordinances forbidding development and moratoria on development
occupy one end of the spectrum, while individual permits occupy the
opposite end. Common sense would dictate that permits should not
necessarily be treated in the same manner as moratoria, because they
each protect different interests. These post-Tahoe-Sierra CFC cases,
therefore, simply reflect heightened concern for critically endangered
resources and the logical corollary that individuals will be required to
endure more when those resources are jeopardized by proposed
development.
Alternately, the CFC and Federal Circuit may have recognized
the ambiguity that remained in temporary takings jurisprudence after
Tahoe-Sierra and are simply attempting to bring some clarity to the
analysis. Perhaps the CFC, by inserting a threshold requirement, is
merely fashioning a brighter line than the ad hoc analysis favored by the
Supreme Court as a way of disposing of cases more cleanly.
A third possible explanation (and an admittedly empty one) is
this: perhaps, despite all of the academic chatter surrounding TahoeSierra, it really did not have as significant an impact on the CFC as some
believe. After all, the use of "extraordinary delay" is not new in federal
permitting cases. If the CFC is simply utilizing a variant form of a test
they had already used widely before the Tahoe-Sierra decision, perhaps
not all that much has changed. Perhaps its true value is in the policy
objectives it furthers rather than any "test" or "analysis" it articulates.
No matter which explanation is the correct one, the fact that the
CFC is treating "permit" cases in the same way that it would treat a
"moratorium" case, and in fact requiring a stricter test by making
"extraordinary delay" a dispositive factor, is significant. In doing so, the

159. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1017 (1992)).
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CFC and Federal Circuit, with Tahoe-Sierra as their polestar, 160 have
constructed a nearly insurmountable test for landowner plaintiffs and, in
so doing, have effectively guaranteed that environmentally friendly
government bars to development will be upheld as constitutional. This
suggests that there is a trend in current U.S. takings jurisprudence
toward favoring government defendants in Fifth Amendment takings
cases where the claim is based on temporary regulatory action. This
trend further reflects recognition of important safeguards on unchecked
development, even when the safeguards (i.e., permits or moratoria) affect
individuals and are mandated from the federal level. This in turn
suggests that there is wider acceptance in the U.S. court system for
interim development controls and recognition for the need for sensible
development and environmental protection. Will this trend continue?
Will the durational element of "extraordinary delay" endure as a
dispositive factor? For the time being, practitioners will have to find
comfort in an exquisitely worded adage: "only time will tell."

160. To borrow from Justice O'Connor's phraseology in Palazzolo, 533 U.S, at 633
(O'Connor, J., concurring).

